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Celeste: Oyez, Oyez: An Inside Look at Romer v. Evans

OYEZ, OYEZ: AN INSIDE LOOK AT ROMER V. EVANS
Judge Mary A. Celeste†
“I, Mary Celeste, do solemnly swear that I will support the
Constitution and the Laws of the State of Colorado and the City
and County of Denver and faithfully perform my duties of the
Office of Judge for Denver County Court.” At age forty-nine, I had
become a judge. I was slated to be a straight suburban housewife,
but I was now instead the first out and open LGBT judge in
Colorado and the Rocky Mountain Region. I went from being a
housewife, to a single lesbian mother, to an attorney, to an LGBT
activist, to an LGBT leader involved in the United States Supreme
1
Court case, Romer v. Evans. As a judge, I would leave behind my
LGBT activism, but my experience with the Romer case would stay
with me forever.

†
Judge Mary A. Celeste currently sits on the Denver County Court bench
where she was the presiding judge in 2009 and 2010. Judge Celeste was the first
woman and out LGBT person to hold that position in the history of that court.
She was also the first out LGBT judge in Colorado. She sat on the Colorado
Advisory Committee for the United States Civil Rights Commission and is
currently a NHTSA Judicial Outreach Liaison for Region 8. She has served as the
president of the Colorado Women’s Bar Association Foundation; the president of
the American Judges Association, where she was the first LGBT judge to hold that
position; a board member and former education co-chair of the International
Association of LGBT Judges; and an adjunct professor at the Sturm College of
Law. She served as a board member of the LGBT Community Center, the
Colorado Bar Association’s Board of Governors, the Colorado Women’s Bar
Association Board of Governors, and the LGBT Victory Fund, where she also
served as the Political Committee Chair. She is the cofounder of the Colorado
Legal Initiatives Project, the nonprofit organization that spearheaded Colorado’s
campaign against Amendment 2, which resulted in the United States Supreme
Court case of Romer v. Evans; the Colorado LGBT Bar Association; and the
Colorado LGBT Chamber of Commerce. She is a pre-eminent national speaker on
the topics of drugged driving, and marijuana and the law. This article is a
modification of a chapter in her forthcoming book entitled MY LIFE IN LAVENDER.
Kellie Lee Gibbs has contributed to this piece.
1. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Amendment 2 was a Colorado statewide initiative to amend
the state constitution in an attempt to eradicate all existing citywide
protections for LGBTs across the state. It was brought by a religious
right organization called Colorado for Family Values (CFV) on the
heels of their loss at the voting booths in Denver. CFV wanted to
overturn a Denver LGBT protective ordinance. In essence,
Amendment 2 stated that every entity in the state was barred from
enacting, adopting, or enforcing any laws that protected LGBTs.
LGBTs would be barred from bringing any claims of
discrimination. The language of the amendment was fairly simple,
but its potential impact was enormous. In full, it read:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or
Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado
through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school
districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute,
regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of,
or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim
any minority status, quota preferences, protected status,
or claim of discrimination. This section of the constitution
2
shall be in all respects self-executing.
In Romer, Amendment 2 was challenged all the way to the United
States Supreme Court.
The holding in that case became one of the most important
LGBT Supreme Court cases and would lay the legal foundation for
overturning the nation’s sodomy laws and pave the way for the
legalization of LGBT marriages. Romer also established the equal
protection argument against the newly developing “religious
3
freedom laws,” which, if passed, would allow individuals or

2. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338–39 (Colo. 1994).
3. See, e.g., S.B. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) (“State Action
shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability.”); H.R. 427, 62d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Idaho 2014) (“Free exercise of religion is a fundamental right that applies in this
state, even if laws, rules or other governmental actions are facially neutral.”); H.R.
2453, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2014) (“[N]o individual or religious entity shall
be required . . . to . . . provide any services, accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods, or privileges . . . related to the celebration of[] any marriage, domestic
partnership, civil union or similar arrangement; . . . solemnize any marriage,
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businesses to turn away LGBT clients as long as they cite religious
4
objections to homosexuality.
The case began in 1992 and ended in 1996. It wound its way
from the state court, which halted the implementation of
Amendment 2 by granting an injunction; to the Colorado Supreme
Court, which affirmed the lower court decision; to its final
5
destination at the United States Supreme Court. In 1991, five years
before Romer reached the Supreme Court, I, along with other
LGBT activists, formed the Colorado Legal Initiatives Project
(CLIP) to prepare a legal challenge in the event that Amendment 2
6
became law. We selected the plaintiffs and the attorneys for the
potential case far in advance of election night. Although the
pundits and the polling seemed to indicate that this initiative would
fail, I felt too nervous to idly stand by and watch. In consultation
with the anti-Amendment 2 campaign manager, Judy Harrington,
and many members of the newly formed Mayor Webb’s LGBT
Committee, we were ready to stop the implementation of
Amendment 2 dead in its tracks.
We agreed that the legal challenge would be homegrown. I
personally solicited former Colorado Supreme Court Justice Jean
Dubofsky as our lead counsel—what a coup! National organizations
such as Lambda Legal and the ACLU, local and national, would
come aboard swiftly, but the case belonged to Coloradoans. We
were “ground zero” along with Oregon, which was facing a similar
discriminatory initiative. The political environment for LGBTs in
Colorado during these five years was very difficult. CFV had been
collecting money from all over the nation and disseminating
hateful pamphlets about the LGBT “lifestyle.”
domestic partnership, civil union or similar arrangement; or treat any . . . as
valid.”). A corollary religious argument was demonstrated in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–62 (2014), which addressed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act as opposed to a First Amendment religious freedom
argument.
4. See, e.g., Kan. H.R. 2453.
5. Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 518586 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec.
14, 1993), aff’d, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), aff’d, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
6. CLIP was formed for the sole purpose of preparing a legal challenge to
Amendment 2. The organization selected the attorneys and plaintiffs, and funded
the expenses for the suit. CLIP also served to coordinate all of the local and
national organizations that participated in the action, including Lambda Legal,
ACLU Gay Rights Project, and Colorado’s ACLU. Currently, CLIP serves as the
legal arm of the Colorado LGBT Community Center.
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CFV was also cloning and exporting the initiative to other
states for use in their next election cycles. Some LGBTs countered
by calling for a boycott of Colorado, which caught fire quickly.
Colorado was deemed the “hate state,” and organizations and
celebrities alike honored the boycott. The boycott affected
Colorado tourism and, needless to say, caught the attention of the
business community. Many people came forward with remedies and
substitutions, none of which gained any momentum. The media
was laden with television pundits and commentators, and the
newspapers had stories and editorials commenting on the legalities
and illegalities of Amendment 2. All eyes were focused on
Colorado. When we finally got to the United States Supreme Court,
based upon my work and involvement, I was able to secure a
ringside seat at the oral arguments.
As I waited outside the Court, crowds of people from Colorado
and all over the country lined up to witness the case. I read to
myself the main inscription on the front architrave high above the
main doors: “Equal Justice Under Law.” Would we find that here
today? Into the courtroom we moved, and I was seated immediately
behind our lead attorneys. Suddenly a hush fell across the
courtroom and entering from behind a flowing red curtain was a
poised and proper man in long coattails. Directing people to their
seats, the bailiff looked as though he belonged in England. Maybe
the Justices would arrive in white powdered wigs. I smiled nervously
7
8
to myself. Jean Dubofsky, Jeanne Winer, and Rick Hills, our team,
entered and sat at their table. Colorado Solicitor General Tim
Tymkovich and Colorado Attorney General Gale Norton sat at the
opposing table directly in front of me. The way I saw it, the warriors
had arrived and were prepared for battle. The power of truth
would be revealed this morning—all that was left to do was express
it convincingly.
I watched the tall bailiff gracefully maneuver about the large
chamber. It was his job to ensure that the court session proceeded
smoothly and timely. He held his back erect and his shoulders
square, with his styled strands of hair pulled up and over a balding
head. Clearing his throat slightly, the bailiff stood tall as he opened
his mouth, “Oyez! Oyez!” He called out the simple words that
snapped the entire room to order. After the room calmed, he

7.
8.

Jeanne Winer is a lesbian attorney from Boulder, Colorado.
Rick Hills was Jean Dubofsky’s assistant.
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called the first case. An expectant quiet rippled through the court.
Smoothly clicking his feet to one side, the bailiff announced the
nine Court Justices. Entering almost simultaneously, they rounded
the heavy curtains that hung behind their massive chairs and sat
down: Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day
O’Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, John Paul Stevens, Anthony M.
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, Stephen G. Breyer,
and David H. Souter.
The way they flowed from behind the curtain openings
reminded me of the Johnny Carson Show: Heeere’s the United States
Supreme Court! I shook off the nervous parody. Standing up
respectfully straight, I released a quiet sigh. In all honesty, I had
expected to feel daunted by the presence of the Justices but
realized instead how very human they were. As I glanced from face
to face, my heart began racing—would they understand? I shifted
uncomfortably in my seat. Would they grasp the true content of our
arguments? Would they get it? Would they see how discriminatory
Colorado’s Amendment 2 was? They were certainly smart enough,
but would their political leanings influence them in the wrong
direction?
My colleagues and I had spent the weekend trying to figure
out which way each Justice would go, what types of questions they
would ask, and whether or not the arguments they needed to hear
would actually be allowed. Did they get the fact that gays and
lesbians are a marginalized group of people? It was common
knowledge that the Justices, with the help of their legal clerks, had
read and reviewed all of the numerous amicus briefs and legal
transcripts from the preceding trials. The legal clerks were chosen
from the crème de la crème of America’s brightest young legal
minds. Few people fully realize how their behind-the-scenes
opinions help shape the legal outcome of each Supreme Court
case. It is the role of the clerks to research each appeal, examine
the stacks of submitted briefs and court records on the case, and
assist the Justices with the drafts and final opinions. The opinions
of the clerks carry tremendous weight in deciding how and what
information reaches the Justices. It is this knowledge that the
Justices carry with them into chambers during their discussions
with each other and into the courtroom.
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Everyone understood that Justice O’Connor was the swing
9
vote. She was the one that Jean needed to legally persuade. If she
could convince her, we would get enough votes. Then there were
Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer who were to the “left,” and,
of course, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
to the “right.” Their votes were relatively predictable. Justice
Kennedy was considered a liberal but we could not place him on
either side of the issue. Throughout Amendment 2’s evolution, it
had been clear to me that the initiative was legally irrational. The
sole purpose of Amendment 2 was to overturn LGBT protective
ordinances and preclude LGBTs from bringing any claims of
discrimination. If you replaced LGBT with any other group of
people, it easily clarified how irrational and discriminatory the
measure really was. But staring at the imposing line of Justices
before me, I remembered that the issue might not be so “cut and
dried” for others.
Nine clerks entered and pushed the Justices’ high-backed
leather chairs forward as they were simultaneously seated. As
expected, a few brief matters were called and decisions given.
Then, the Amendment 2 case was called. Showtime! I stared into the
back of Jean’s head for a response. There was none. In fact, Jean
was not flinching; her head was poised and her back straight. What
was going through her mind, I wondered. It had taken far longer
than first imagined to get here. She hung in like a trooper, her
style and class bringing solidarity and confidence to everyone
involved. Jean would be granted just under a half hour to present
our case. As the respondent, she would go second. Timothy
Tymkovich, from the Colorado Attorney General’s Office, would go
first and would probably reserve a portion of his allotted time for
rebuttal. Whenever attorneys go before an appeals panel, they
hope to deliver their statements uninterrupted. If the argument is
not clear, or the Justices want to make points, they may, and usually
do, interject with questions. Valuable—invaluable—time is wasted.
Tymkovich rose to speak. Squaring his shoulders, he turned to
face Chief Justice Rehnquist. “Mr. Chief Justice and may it please
the Court—this case involves a challenge to the authority of a state
to allocate certain law-making power among its state and local
9. See generally Abigail Perkiss, A Look Back at Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
Court Legacy, YAHOO! (July 2, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/look-back
-justice-sandra-day-o-connor-court-094809112.html (recognizing Justice O’Connor
as an important swing voter on the Court at the time Romer was argued).
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governments. Colorado’s Amendment 2 reserves to the State the
decision of whether to extend special protections under state law on
10
the basis of homosexual or bisexual conduct or orientation.”
As the manipulative words “special protections” fell from his
lips, many of the court Justices seemed to become visibly agitated.
Good, I thought. Even though the Equal Protection Ordinance
Coalition (EPOC), the statewide campaign organization fighting
against Amendment 2, could not effectively confront CFV’s “special
rights” campaign slogan, maybe the legal arguments could
confront it. It looked as though at least some of the Justices were
not going to be as naïve as some Colorado citizens. And how were
the Justices going to deal with the question of conduct versus
orientation?
I knew that the case would move quickly. I also knew that many
laypeople in the audience would have difficulty understanding the
legal language being used. Where spectators might have difficulty
with wording, the body language was quite clear. The Court, like
the nation, was divided. Tymkovich went on to cite two previous
11
Supreme Court decisions. The first, James v. Valtierra, focused on
12
low-income housing. The second, Hunter v. Erickson, focused on
the issue of race.
Like the Romer case, the Hunter and James cases included equal
protection challenges to a referendum or initiative. In Hunter,
black residents challenged an amendment to a city charter that
prevented the city council from implementing any ordinance
dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in housing
13
without the approval of the majority of voters in Akron, Ohio.
Like Amendment 2’s attempt to overturn existing protections, the
Akron city charter amendment sought to overturn an existing city
protection on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or
10. Oral Argument at 0:28, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_1039. To
interfere with the author’s narrative as little as possible while remaining faithful to
the source material, citations to the audio recording of the oral transcript are
provided at the end of unbroken sections of dialogue from the arguments. The
William Mitchell Law Review has taken reasonable steps to verify the accuracy of the
quoted material, but all emphasis within, and interpretation of, the speakers’
delivery of dialogue provided in this article conveys the author’s personal
experience of the live events.
11. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
12. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
13. See id. at 385.
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ancestry. The Supreme Court found that this constituted an equal
protection violation because the amendment to the charter not
only suspended the operation of the existing ordinance forbidding
housing discrimination, but also made an explicit racial
classification treating racial housing matters differently from other
15
housing matters.
The James decision, although relying on the Hunter case, did
16
not find an equal protection violation. Following the California
voters’ approval of a referendum that sought to bring public
housing decisions under the state’s referendum policy, the
defendants, who were persons eligible for low-cost public housing,
17
challenged Article XXXIV of the California constitution. The
article stated that no low-rent housing projects were to be
developed, constructed, or acquired by any state public body
without the approval of a majority of those voting at a community
18
election. The Supreme Court distinguished Hunter and James,
stating, “Unlike the Akron referendum provision, it cannot be said
that California’s Article XXXIV rests on ‘distinctions based on
19
race.’” “The Article require[d] referendum approval for any lowrent public housing project, not only for projects [that would] be
20
occupied by a racial minority.” It was clear that our side wanted
the Court to analyze the case under Hunter and the State wanted
the Court to analyze it under James.
Before Tymkovich could expound on these cases, Justice
Kennedy stopped Tymkovich’s testimony dead in its tracks. His saltand-pepper hair gave his appearance an air of certainty and
experience. “Usually when we have an equal protection question
we measure the objective of the legislature against the class that is
adopted . . . . Here, the classification seems to be adopted for its
own sake,” Justice Kennedy continued, sounding appalled. “I’ve
never seen a case like this. Is there any precedent that you can cite
21
to the Court where we’ve upheld a law such as this?”

14. Id. at 386–87.
15. Id. at 393.
16. James, 402 U.S. at 143.
17. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 385.
18. Id. at 387.
19. James, 402 U.S. at 141 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391).
20. Id.
21. Oral Argument at 1:41, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_1039.
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Tymkovich tried desperately to establish a link between
22
Amendment 2 and James. “In James v. Valtierra the Court . . .
fundamentally looked at whether Hunter v. Erickson should extend
beyond the specific racial context in which it was decided—”
Justice Kennedy interrupted immediately. After elaborating on
the specific legislative purpose of the classification in James,
Kennedy asserted, “Here, the classification is just adopted for its
own sake, with reference to all purposes of the law, so James doesn’t
work. . . . Here, the classification is adopted to ‘fence out,’ in the
Colorado Supreme Court’s words, the class for all purposes, and
23
I’ve never seen a statute like that.”
Unconsciously, I brought my right hand up to my temple and
began running my fingers through my hair. Justice Kennedy’s vote,
along with Justice O’Connor’s and Justice Souter’s, could not be
easily predicted. Although it gave an early indication of where he
stood on the amendment, it was obvious that he had just blown a
big hole in the State’s case. “Your Honor,” Tymkovich countered,
“the objective here was to resolve an issue of whether or not to
extend special protections to homosexuals and bisexuals, so the
issue resolved here—”
“Well, Mr. Tymkovich!” Justice O’Connor interrupted, “the
language of the Amendment, I guess, has never been actually
interpreted by the Colorado courts!”
“The Colorado—” Tymkovich began before being cut off
again.
24
“Has it been construed or interpreted as yet, in your view?”
Justice O’Connor continued.
Tymkovich admitted that yes, the Colorado courts made an
interpretation based on its “face value.” The apparent meaning of
Amendment 2’s wording overpowered local laws and state
provisions. In other words, any ordinances in effect in Denver,
Aspen, Boulder or any other city (as well as statutes passed by the
state legislature) offering protection from discrimination to gays
and lesbians were null and void.
“I mean,” Justice O’Connor proceeded, “the literal language
would indicate that, for example, a public library could refuse to

22.
23.
24.

James, 402 U.S. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Oral Argument at 2:49, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039).
Id. at 3:10.
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allow books to be borrowed by homosexuals and there would be no
25
relief from that, apparently.”
The questions they were asking were a key indication, at least
to me, that the Justices did understand and accept some of the
arguments we had filed with the Court. Most importantly, they
confirmed with each question that there might be something
indeed wrong with Amendment 2. Hold it, I thought, do not get too
hopeful now. Worried that I might be reading too much into the
line of questioning, I turned to my left to look at the Denver City
Attorney Darleen Ebert’s response to the exchange. Nodding her
head with each word, she looked at me and silently confirmed what
I was thinking. YES!
“And as Justice Kennedy pointed out,” Justice Ginsburg said,
“James v. Valtierra dealt with one issue, low-cost housing. There were
dozens of other ways in which to improve the status of the poor, to
fight against the blight of poverty. But here, it’s everything . . . thou
shalt not have access to the ordinary legislative process for anything
that will improve the condition of this particular group . . . and I
would like to know whether in all of U.S. history there has been any
legislation like this that earmarks groups and says, you will not be
26
able to appeal to your state legislature to improve your status.”
I paused it all. Briefly closing my eyes, I slowly inhaled a few
deep breaths. The entire event felt like a dream. For over four years
I had “lived” this moment, playing the scene over and over again.
Measuring my breath, I again looked up.
“Mr. Tymkovich,” Justice Scalia said firmly, peering over the
bench, “what about laws prohibiting bigamy, or prohibiting
homosexuality or homosexual conduct? Incidentally, how do you
interpret the bisexual orientation language, homosexual, lesbian,
or bisexual orientation? Does that require any conduct, or is it just
27
the disposition?”
Here we go, I thought, scrutinizing Justice Scalia’s stern face.
The conservative Justice was attempting to throw Tymkovich a
lifeline. By aiming the Court’s attention to a person’s conduct,
Justice Scalia was giving the attorney an opportunity to distinguish
28
between orientation and conduct. If he was successful, the Bowers
25. Id. at 3:54.
26. Id. at 6:05.
27. Id. at 6:48.
28. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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case might apply. Other than cases addressing gay people in the
military, Bowers, decided ten years prior, was the most impactful
case to be heard by the United States Supreme Court on gay and
lesbian rights. Unfortunately, it upheld Georgia’s discriminatory
29
anti-sodomy law. It also made a distinction between homosexual
30
conduct and orientation.
We decided early on to stay away from the Bowers case; it would
make our efforts to overturn Amendment 2 far too broad. The
Bowers case was a disturbing ruling and would be used often to
focus on behavior of LGBTs as opposed to sexual orientation as a
classification. Many activists across the country, including me,
wanted it overturned. However, our attorneys were concerned that
if we sought to do that with this case, we may bite off more than we
could chew. Although some of the national organizations were
pushing in that direction, we wanted to narrow the focus to
Colorado’s Amendment 2 facts only. Long ago I had learned to
build a movement on small successes, and biting off too big a piece
could cause confusion. The probable concern of the Court was that
someone could challenge a state sodomy law using the Amendment
2 decision and other creative legal arguments to seek to overturn
the Bowers case. Many years later, Bowers would be overturned by
31
Lawrence v. Texas, but at the time, it was a thorny case decision on
our issues.
“I want to know,” Justice Scalia interrupted, “what you mean
by . . . what is meant by . . . if all orientation means is someone who
engages in homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual acts, then you have
plenty of precedent in response to your question, namely
state laws that absolutely criminalize such activity . . . bigamy,
32
homosexuality—” Justice Scalia was determined to aid Tymkovich.
He quickly tried to get his message across.
“That’s right! The—” Tymkovich was instantly cut off.
“Colorado has no law that prohibits consensual homosexual
33
conduct,” Justice Ginsburg interrupted. She was making a point
that Colorado did not have a sodomy law, which distinguished this
case from Bowers.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 196.
See id.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Oral Argument at 7:29, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039).
Id. at 7:41.
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“No. Colorado repealed its sodomy law in 1972, but to
34
answer—” Tymkovich rushed—he had been passed the ball by
Justice Scalia and was now frantically trying to score.
“Well?”
“Justice Scalia’s question, it is unclear whether conduct defines
the class. Many courts have so held in looking at the issue of a
classification involving—”
“You have no position on it? You have no position on it?!” Justice
Scalia demanded.
“Yes!” Tymkovich said. Catching onto the lifeline thrust by
Justice Scalia, the attorney quickly added, “We believe that conduct
is the best indicator of—”
“Well, is it the sole indicator?” Justice Souter commanded.
“Are you representing to this Court that Colorado’s position is that
the class defining characteristic is conduct as opposed to
preference or proclivity or whatnot?”
“No, Your Honor . . . . There was an attempt by the
35
respondents to prove a suspect class.”
Looking back and forth from Jean to Tymkovich, my heart
swelled with pride. I was sure it was because Jean’s presentation of
the case would be more fluid. Her selection as the lead counsel
demonstrated the importance of selecting the right people for such
a monumental job. How people dress, talk, act and present
themselves does make an impression. Personalities, however subtle,
affect the outcome. As a practicing attorney and judge, I have
witnessed this notion first hand with jurors.
Sitting behind the attorneys’ tables gave me a perspective of
the proceedings I rarely saw anymore. Again, I pondered how
“human” each player was—and hopefully how humane. Joined in
the mind of each Justice were the values, morals, legal
responsibility—heck, even childhood impressions—helping to
formulate each decision. To deny this fact would be to deny human
nature.
Tymkovich was blinking his eyes as he spoke. I held back the
anger that welled up over the years. No. I would not succumb to the
bitterness of hate; it had never served me or my causes well. But it
was difficult—no, it was nearly impossible—to squash the animosity
that I felt towards the proponents and supporters of the

34.
35.

Id. at 7:45.
Id. at 8:16.
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discriminatory amendment. I caught myself. This is the same
animosity held against LGBTs. From that moment forward, I would
no longer indulge myself with any animosity.
Tymkovich denied that there was any “arbitrary or irrational”
discrimination involved in the language of Amendment 2. “No,
Your Honor. We don’t think—”
“It’s not a slippery slope argument.” Justice Souter said.
“You’re not saying we go from . . . if an equal protection challenge
wins here, a due process challenge necessarily wins too. You’re not
saying that.”
“There’s been no due process challenge in this case—”
Tymkovich said.
“But,” Justice Souter interrupted, “that’s not what you’re
arguing.”
“—and there is—” Tymkovich tried to finish.
“But, that’s not what you’re arguing, is that—”
“That’s correct,” Tymkovich said hurriedly. “There is a
36
slippery . . . .”
I shook my head as I remembered the time I sat across from
Tymkovich to argue the merits of Amendment 2 and gay rights on
television. The debate was hosted by Clifford May, a political
commentator and associate editor of the Rocky Mountain News in
Denver. Years later, May went on to become the communications
director to the Republican National Committee. At the time,
however, he hosted a talk radio program on the dominant station
in the region and also produced and moderated an interview
program on KRMA-TV, a PBS station. It was called the
“Roundtable” and Tymkovich and I sat across from one another at
that table with May in the middle. I recalled how confident I felt as
I told the TV host that the Justices would overturn Amendment 2,
just as they understood that “separate” was not “equal” in Brown v.
37
Board of Education. All these years later, while watching him argue
before the Supreme Court, I remembered why I felt so assured at
the time of our debate—he was simply wrong. Tymkovich and I
would cross career paths again many years after the Romer case,
when, in 2003, he was appointed to the federal bench by President
Bush. I had been appointed to a Denver County court judgeship
three years earlier by Mayor Webb.

36.
37.

Id. at 11:44.
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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It was clear that some of the Justices understood. But would a
sufficient number of them agree to keep Amendment 2
overturned? As was customary, Justice Clarence Thomas had not
spoken a single word. His mind is made up, I thought.
“Mr. Tymkovich,” Justice Ginsburg began adamantly, “I was
trying to think of something comparable to this, and what occurred
to me is that this political means of going to the local level first is
38
familiar in American politics.” The Justice was comparing the antidiscrimination ordinances protecting gays and lesbians in the cities
of Denver, Aspen, and Boulder to the same type of city ordinances
39
that assisted in protecting women for voting purposes.
Justice Ginsburg went on, “In fact, it was the way that the
suffragists worked. When they were unable to achieve the vote
statewide, they did it on a cities-first approach, and I take it from
what you are arguing that if there had been a referendum that said
no local ordinance can give women the vote, that that would have
been constitutional.”
“No, Your Honor. I think that . . . that—”
“What’s the difference?!” she exclaimed.
“—classification would be analyzed under this Court’s equal
40
protection jurisprudence on a suspect—” Tymkovich was taking
on something bigger than he was, I thought, shaking my head
slowly. Was he really going to argue with a female Supreme Court
Justice about women’s rights?
“Well,” Justice Ginsburg said leaning forward on her elbows,
“cast your mind back to the days before the Nineteenth
41
Amendment.” The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, gave
42
women the right to vote. No state could deny any person his or
her constitutional privilege to vote based on gender. Her argument
made a laughingstock of the State’s case. Questions from the bench
flew at Tymkovich so fast that he rarely was able to answer
completely. Faltering through each attempted response, invariably
a Justice would throw up his or her hand to make Tymkovich stop
while he or she began arguing with the other Justices. The energy
in the courtroom was electric, and my head continued to spin.
38. Oral Argument at 12:23, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039).
39. Colorado’s Tourism Fighting Anti-Gay Boycott, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at
MN-Main News, available at 1992 WLNR 4063875.
40. Oral Argument at 12:54, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039).
41. Id. at 12:57.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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Justice Ginsburg was my hero. Her line of questioning
43
demonstrated that she truly understood civil rights.
“No court has found homosexual orientation or conduct to be
a suspect classification. Therefore, the traditional equal protection
44
model should be applied in this case,” Tymkovich stated. The
attorney was honing in on a delicate spot. Conservative members of
the bench felt that gays and lesbians should not be in the same class
as race, gender, age, and other protected classes. Engaged, he too
expanded on the issue of suspect classification. Then suddenly, the
line of questioning shifted.
“When you talk about ‘special protections,’” Justice Scalia
remarked pointedly, “this brings me to an earlier question about
discrimination in libraries. How do you interpret the term,
minority status quota preferences protected status?” he asked. “You
45
mean—what does that mean?”
The question was another attempt to aid the attorney, allowing
him a chance to denounce classifying homosexuals as a legally
protected class.
“Protected status would be a particular affirmative positive
piece of legislation that granted some type of protection—”
Tymkovich said before being cut off.
“Special protection beyond what—” Justice Scalia interrupted.
46
“Beyond the Fourteenth Amendment baseline.” Tymkovich
had happily taken the bait. The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in
1868, along with the First and Fourth Amendments, is the most

43. Little did I know that over a decade later I would get to personally
introduce Justice Ginsburg at a judicial conference. With the help of a former
federal woman judge who I knew through the Colorado Woman’s Bar Association,
I was able to secure Justice Ginsburg as one of the keynote speakers along with a
Justice from the Canadian Supreme Court. My reward for doing so was that I got
to introduce her at the opening plenary session to all 550 judges in attendance. My
tenure as chair of the American Judges Association’s Education Committee
culminated in coordinating this conference. It was held in Vancouver, Canada and
included the American Judges Association, the Canadian Provincial Judges
Association, a few individual Provincial Judges Associations and, at the behest of
LGBT Canadian Judge Gary Cohen and myself, the LGBT Judges Association. The
only thing that I loved more than breaking new ground as a gay person was the
cross-pollination of straight and gay organizations. This conference proved to be
one of the highlights of my legal career.
44. Oral Argument at 13:39, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039).
45. Id. at 14:45.
46. Id. at 14:58.
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called-upon constitutional provision in Supreme Court cases. It
forbids the enforcement or creation by any state of any law that
48
infringes on the individual’s rights under the U.S. Constitution. It
was intended to protect citizens against any state action that results
in deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law—or in denial of the equal protection of the laws.
“So,” Justice Scalia followed, “why wouldn’t that have been
your answer to the library hypothetical that was produced earlier?!
Any—no homosexual can be treated differently from other people.
He simply cannot be given special protection by reason of that
status.”
“That’s right!” Tymkovich agreed. “Amendment 2 is simply a
49
Fourteenth Amendment—” Justice Scalia had led the horse to
water and Tymkovich was ready to drink.
Justice Stevens aborted the fleeting triumph. “May I ask how
that works in the public accommodation area? If a hotel or
restaurant—at common law you get some kind of an innkeeper’s
duty to take everybody in. Could an innkeeper refuse
accommodations to a homosexual who was not engaging in any
homosexual conduct but had admitted that he had that type of
tendency? Could an innkeeper under—in Colorado just say, ‘I’m
50
sorry, we don’t rent rooms to people like you?’” Ironically, this
argument would serve to foreshadow a case decided almost twenty
years later on the issue of whether businesses open to the public
51
could deny services based upon their religious beliefs.
“Amendment 2 would carve out any special protections in the
public accommodation area that had been extended to
homosexuals—” Tymkovich replied.
47. See Barry Horwitz, A Fresh Look at A Stale Doctrine: How Public Policy and the
Tenets of Piercing the Corporate Veil Dictate the Inapplicability of the Intracorporate
Conspiracy Doctrine to the Civil Rights Arena, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 131, 134 n.35
(2008) (“[S]ection 1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is arguably the most
important and most litigated law in the nation’s history.” (citing Sanford Levinson,
Why It’s Smart to Think About Constitutional Stupidities, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 364
(2000))); Martin Kelly, 14th Amendment Summary, ABOUT.COM, http://
americanhistory.about.com/od/usconstitution/a/14th-Amendment-Summary
.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (“Over time, numerous lawsuits have arisen that
have referenced the 14th amendment.”).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. Oral Argument at 15:17, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039).
50. Id. at 15:40.
51. See supra, note 3 and accompanying text.
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“What would the rule be in Colorado? How do you understand
the law there? Now, would a homosexual have a right to be served
in a restaurant?” Justice Stevens insisted.
“A homosexual would not have any claim of discrimination or
special liability theory in a private setting after Amendment 2,”
Tymkovich admitted.
“Even in the public accommodation area,” Justice Stevens
52
continued.
I, like others in the courtroom, was on the edge of my seat.
The exchange demonstrated how gays and lesbians would be
targeted for discrimination where other citizens were not.
“So we don’t know whether homosexuals have a right to be
served or not,” Justice Stevens continued.
“That will be a question for the state courts interpreting
Amendment 2,” Tymkovich said. “But, if they do have a right to be
served, would that be an affirmative right, then, as in the
distinction Justice Scalia was drawing, or would that be just being
treated like everybody else?”
“I think,” Tymkovich responded, choosing his words carefully,
“it would be treated just like any other characteristic or
classification that has not gotten the special benefits of the civil
rights law.”
“And being—having the right not to be refused a job or to rent
on that ground is a special right,” Justice Stevens queried with
eyebrows raised.
“Unless—” Tymkovich tried to interject.
53
“It’s not being just like everybody else,” the Justice finished.
That’s right, I responded gently nodding my head. I was totally
invested in the case. There was not a day that had gone by over the
years that I had not thought about this moment. As a tear trickled
down my face, I quickly raised the back of my hand to brush it
away. Suddenly, I stopped. So what, let them see it, I reasoned. This
was a tear of struggle. These were our civil rights they were talking
about. Shifting in my chair to a more upright position, I raised my
head and searched the faces of the Justices.
Arguing about the supposed “rational basis” for Amendment 2,
it appeared to me that the Justices were in disagreement about
whether people outside of Aspen had a right to tell the citizens of

52.
53.

Oral Argument at 16:17, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039).
Id. at 17:04.
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Aspen whether or not they could elect to have a nondiscriminatory
provision. Could the State of Colorado tell one of its cities that it
can no longer conform to its own laws?
“There’s a question about the desirability of each local
jurisdiction dealing with this issue,” Tymkovich contested, “which I
think raises some very fundamental and sensitive cultural, moral,
54
political concerns for our state.” His neck, I realized, was clearly
on the line with such a statement.
Justice Souter continued to press Tymkovich on this issue until
Justice Scalia suddenly exploded, “MR. TYMKOVICH! If this is an
ordinary equal protection challenge and there’s no heightened
scrutiny, isn’t it an adequate answer to Justice Souter’s question to
say that this is the only area in which we’ve had a problem? If
localities started passing special laws giving favored treatment to
people with blue eyes, we might have a statewide referendum on
that as well. Isn’t one step at a time a normal response to equal
protection?”
“That’s exactly what happened here,” Tymkovich struggled to
edge in, “and the court—”
55
“Well, what is the problem?”
Justice Souter said
admonishingly. Suddenly throwing a court brief across the bench,
the Justice seemed incensed. “I mean, what is the problem that you
supposedly have been having?!”
Tymkovich said, “[L]aws that raise particular and sensitive
liberty concerns.”
Justice Scalia joined in another attempt to rescue the
floundering attorney. “State—state subdivisions giving preferences
which the majority of the people in the state did not think were
56
desirable for social reasons, isn’t that the problem that was seen?”
Justice Scalia offered. There it was, the majority rules argument, I
thought. Let’s put my rights up for vote!
57
“That’s right,” Tymkovich said, relieved.
“Isn’t your answer, this is the only area where the people
apparently saw a problem, which is enough for equal protection?”
Justice Scalia continued.
“It is,” the attorney said, “and this is an area where there have
been piecemeal additions of special protections. We’ve had—”
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 20:50.
Id. at 22:06.
Id. at 22:30.
Id. at 22:31.
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“What is the special preference at stake here? What is the
58
special preference that a homosexual gets?” questioned Justice
Stevens. Each trying to be heard, the Justices’ raised voices layered
over each other. I was breathless.
“[W]ith this Amendment on the books, a restaurant owner can
say, ‘Sorry, I don’t want to serve gay people,’ and what about—take
a scarce resource. Think of a public hospital that has a kidney
dialysis machine, and the hospital says, ‘We have to limit this, and
one group that we’re going to keep out, we’re not going to have
any gay, any lesbian person use this—use this facility.’ Now there
59
would be, under this Amendment, what recourse?!” asked Justice
Ginsburg.
“[T]hat’s the rule that the public hospital sets. Under this
Amendment, that’s okay, right?!”
Tymkovich stated, “[W]e don’t know how the court is going to
construe other potentially applicable state laws.”
“How—I do have one question on that point which I’d like to
ask,” Justice Breyer said. “The statute says, ‘no agency shall adopt or
enforce any policy whereby homosexual conduct, or whatever,
60
orientation, shall be the basis of any claim of discrimination.’ So if
a police department says, ‘There’s been a lot of gay bashing. It’s
our policy. Stop it.’ If the head librarian says, ‘You’re making gays
sit—you’re being mean to them and not letting them in. Stop it.’ If
the health department says the same thing, if the insurance
commissioner says the same thing, doesn’t this word policy cover
that, and if it doesn’t cover it, what is it about?”
“The government agencies that you’ve indicated could enact a
61
general non-bias policy or require—” Tymkovich said. “It
prohibits any type of special protection or a liability claim that
somebody might have under that policy,” he replied firmly.
“It seems to me,” Justice Kennedy said, “that your answer is
inconsistent to what the Supreme Court of Colorado said. It said
health insurance discrimination regulations are void.”
“The health—” the attorney began.
“That’s . . . based on sexual orientation.” Justice Kennedy
interrupted.
58. Id. at 22:56.
59. Id. at 23:46.
60. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2013
amendments).
61. Oral Argument at 25:14, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039).
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“The health—that regulation did carve out what would be
construed as special protection,” Tymkovich replied.
“That’s inconsistent with the answer you gave to Justice
Breyer!”
“I don’t think so, Your Honor,” Tymkovich said, “because I
thought he was talking about a law of general application—”
“No! Look, suppose Boulder, Colorado says, ‘It is our policy in
Boulder not to discriminate against gays.’ They call it Boulder
Regulation 14.2. Is that forbidden by this?” Justice Breyer asked.
“Yes,” Tymkovich finally conceded, “It would be to the
extent—”
“All right,” Justice Breyer interrupted. “Now, suppose the
police department does exactly the same thing. Is that forbidden by
this?”
“The police department would be governed by a rule of
general applica—” the attorney continued.
“So, the police department—”
“They would not be able to—” Tymkovich rushed.
“I don’t understand. So is the city of Colorado,” Justice Breyer
said, mixing his words. “They’re all governed by, they can’t
discriminate arbitrarily. My point is, suppose that the police
department says exactly the same thing. You say that’s not
forbidden.”
“That’s correct,” the attorney said, sounding exhausted.
“Okay.”
“Your Honor?” Tymkovich said. “May I reserve the balance of
my time for rebuttal?”
“Yes,” Chief Justice Rehnquist said calmly. “Thank you, Mr.
62
Tymkovich. Ms. Dubofsky, we’ll hear from you.”
Jean rose gracefully; her courtroom demeanor was spirited and
alive, and her delivery was clear and concise. Due to her
impeccable legal experience as an attorney and former justice of
the Colorado Supreme Court, she had pedigree and seemed to be
respected.
“Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Let me begin
with how Amendment 2 should be construed and then discuss how
our legal theories relate to its unique combination of breadth and
selectivity,” she began. “Amendment 2 is vertically broad in that it
prohibits all levels of government in the State of Colorado from ever
62.

Id. at 27:34.
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providing any opportunity for one to seek protection from
63
discrimination on the basis of gay orientation.”
Not only did Jean carefully choose which words to emphasize,
she opened her testimony using the word “gay.” Tymkovich refused
to use the word at all, choosing instead to say “homosexual.” Even
64
the Justices used the word “gay” in their line of questioning.
“Well,” Chief Justice Rehnquist began, “when you say ‘all levels
of government in Colorado,’ Ms. Dubofsky, you don’t include the
people by referendum, I take it, or the people by initiative.”
“No, we do not.”
“And I have one more very specific question,” Justice Kennedy
said. “What about the courts? Can the courts interpret a statute that
prohibits unreasonable denial of public accommodations to
include gays by a specific judgment that deals with the rights of gay
people?”
“The state,” Jean said, referring to the Colorado Supreme
Court decision, “has conceded that Amendment 2 is
unconstitutional to the degree it would prohibit such a claim based
upon federal law since 1983.”
“No, no, no. I meant state courts interpreting state public
accommodation laws,” the Justice boomed.
“Our theory,” Jean replied, unwavering, “is that Amendment 2
on its face prohibits a state court from recognizing such a claim,
but that particular interpretation of the amendment is not
necessary for this Court to find that Amendment 2 is
unconstitutional.”
“Thank you, and that particular interpretation has not been
65
given by the supreme court of Colorado,” Justice Kennedy stated.
It was an attempt, I figured, to discredit Jean’s firm stance
concerning what the Colorado court intended by its decision to
overturn Amendment 2. The United States Supreme Court had the
63. Id. at 28:13.
64. The GLBT community generally refers to itself as the “gay” community
rather than “homosexual” community. The word “homosexual” sounds either too
clinical or religiously-forbidden since it includes “sex” as part of the identity. CFV
capitalized on the word homosexual during the campaign by placing it in its
campaign materials to focus in on the “sexual” behaviour of gays. They distributed
a video to voters that depicted gay men participating in the gay parade while nude.
To make “sex” the centrepiece of the gay lifestyle, it moved the argument from
orientation to behaviour. Duke Law Sch., Romer v. Evans, YOUTUBE (July 28, 2014),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZEZ7PMQbQE.
65. Oral Argument at 29:14, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039).
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prerogative to remand the case back to the Colorado Supreme
Court for interpretation of the Amendment: a decision that would
belabor our case. It was a potential outcome that none of us
wanted.
“That’s right,” the attorney said. “The Colorado Supreme
Court interpreted the amendment, and it said it was doing this as a
minimum, because that was all that was necessary in order to find
the amendment unconstitutional.
“It interpreted the amendment to mean that state and local
governments are barred from promulgating and enforcing rules
that declare discrimination against gay people by both government
and private actors to be arbitrary, so that would include Justice
Breyer’s general policy suggestion with respect to the police
department,” Jean added.
“[C]ounsel for the other side said, ‘No . . . it doesn’t forbid any
of these agencies from having such a rule,’” Justice Breyer stated.
“The Colorado Supreme Court interpretation of this
amendment is authoritative for purposes of this argument, I
believe,” Jean replied, “and the Colorado Supreme Court—”
“Where does it say that in the Colorado Supreme Court’s
66
opinion?!” Justice Scalia retorted.
Everyone in the packed room suddenly took a deep breath. If
Jean could not recall exactly which passage addressed the issue of
the Amendment’s unconstitutionality, our team would instantly
lose credibility. It also raised the possibility of having Amendment 2
remanded back to Colorado’s trial court for interpretation.
Glancing down at her legal pad, Jean’s index finger instantly
came to rest. “It says that,” Jean said, looking directly at the Justice,
“on page B-3, D-24—”
The courtroom was abuzz. Chief Justice Rehnquist
67
interrupted, “of the white appendix, or the—”
“Yes,” Jean interjected before he could finish, “in the white
appendix. B-3, D-24, and D-25.”
“D as in does?”
“D as in David, or does, yes.” Jean said, her voice warm and her
manner controlled, “and the way in which the Colorado Supreme
Court says that is by giving examples of the types of provisions that

66.
67.

Id. at 30:17.
Id. at 30:22.
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would be repealed by the amendment, or precluded from
enactment in the future.”
“B-3?” Justice Scalia mumbled. “What does it say on B-3 that
68
says that?”
Jean was restraining any sign of frustration. The Justice was
clearly wasting valuable time, but to give any indication of
annoyance would be detrimental. Tymkovich had stuttered and
stammered his way through responses to questions, at times at a
loss for critical information. It was better, I knew, to be slow in
one’s response—at least until the controlled and proper reply was
clear.
“Is it B—” Justice Breyer began.
“It—B-3—you said B as in—” Justice Scalia asked, befittingly.
“B as in boy,” Jean said resolutely.
“It seems to me it says the effect, the ultimate effect is to
prohibit any government entity from adopting similar or more
protective statutes, regulations, or orders in the future.”
“Yes,” Jean replied calmly, “and it refers back to the first
sentence. It says, the immediate objective of Amendment 2 is at a
minimum to repeal existing statutes, regulations, ordinances, and
policies. Then on pages—”
“Wait,” Justice Scalia said raising his palm toward Jean, “that
barred discrimination based on sexual orientation. I assume that
that means special provisions giving special protection—”
“Well—” Jean began.
“—as opposed to a general law that says you have to, not just
accept homosexuals, but all citizens have to be accommodated at
hotels.”
“That’s correct,” Jean confirmed. After a brief pause, she
continued, “There are general laws that say—”
“As opposed to a special law that says a private homeowner
who wants to rent a room—you know, the mom and a family that
wants to do bed and breakfast cannot discriminate . . . .” Justice
Scalia interjected, eyeing to clarify his disapproval. “Although it has
no obligation to take the public at large, it can decide to take only
Irishmen if it wants, but it cannot discriminate on the basis of
homosexuality. I thought that’s the kind of thought the court is
referring to here.”
“The Colorado Supreme Court is referring to?” Jean repeated.
68.

Id. at 30:59.
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“Yes.”
“No, I don’t think so,” Jean continued. “I think it’s
referring to the general ordinances that were preempted by
Amendment 2 . . . .”
“You mean no general laws can be applied to homosexuals
now?!” Justice Scalia asked. “They can be bashed, they can be
69
murdered, they—all sorts of things! Is that what it means?!”
Jean was not about to be suckered into such a line of
questioning. Taking a breath and shifting to her left foot, she
leaned forward and said, “We think it can mean that, but we don’t
think the Colorado Supreme Court found it necessary to go that far
in its interpretation—” She continued, “and we’re not arguing that
it needs to be interpreted that broadly in order to find Amendment
70
2 unconstitutional,” Jean said matter-of-factly.
“I think,” she began slowly, “we’re having trouble . . . with
semantics. One of the difficulties is the use of the words ‘special
protection’ in this case. I don’t think there is such a thing as
‘special rights’ or ‘special protections.’ I think there’s a right which
71
everyone has to be free from arbitrary discrimination!”
As the Justices proceeded to argue and define arbitrary
discrimination at various levels of government, I tried to sort
through the arguments. The Justices needed to be kept on track
with regard to the devastation Amendment 2 would wreak on gay
and lesbian civil rights. Jean was doing a heck of a job maintaining
the panel’s focus on Amendment 2’s inherent evils.
The courtroom was mesmerized as Jean drove home her
points with refined articulation and nonverbal movements. She
moved her hands as she spoke, turning her head to look at each
Justice to accentuate her points. Assertive, yes, but Jean drew the
line at direct confrontation. She wanted and needed to hold the
interest of the nine Justices long enough to make her main point—
the Colorado Supreme Court found Amendment 2
unconstitutional, and they should as well. Returning swift and clear
answers, Jean kept the conversation moving.
“Let me put it to you this way,” Justice Kennedy said to Jean,
“suppose there’s a Colorado ordinance, or city ordinance which
said you cannot bar people from public accommodations for any

69.
70.
71.

Id. at 32:45.
Id. at 32:59.
Id. at 33:27.
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arbitrary or unreasonable reason. . . . After this amendment, could
a court in Colorado find that it was unreasonable or arbitrary to bar
a person from public accommodations by reason of sexual
orientation?”
72
“I think a court could find that, yes,” Jean said. “If that
criteria in the particular case is because the person who was denied
that benefit is a gay person, then I think under Amendment 2 the
court would not be able to provide relief. . . . Amendment 2, if
interpreted at its broadest, would authorize that type of
73
discrimination.”
Reporters’ pens were flying as they took notes and tried to
keep up with every word. The noise level in the courtroom was at a
low hum with spectators shuffling in their seats, clearing their
throats, and rattling paper.
The Justices branched off to argue amongst themselves,
through Jean, about whether any part of Amendment 2, if applied,
was constitutional.
“We’re saying,” Jean repeated, “that the minimal interpretation
that the Colorado Supreme Court gave to this in all of its
applications is invalid. Because there may be other types of
applications of this amendment, we don’t have to deal with those in
74
this particular facial challenge because they’re basically irrelevant.”
“Suppose that Colorado is concerned that one city has passed
an ordinance giving preference to gays in employment hiring, and
for any number of reasons the citizens of Colorado do not want
that. Some people say they want uniform laws because it’s easier on
employers. Could the citizens of Colorado by referendum repeal
that ordinance?” Justice Kennedy asked.
“Could they also provide that no such ordinance shall be
75
adopted in the future?” he added.
“That’s where it gets more difficult. That’s where our political
participation argument comes to play, that by disabling a
government from responding to a need for a particular benefit, the
type of protection that—it depends upon the circumstances,” Jean
said.
“Well,” Justice Kennedy began, “it would seem a little odd that
there could be an ordinance enacted, then repealed by the
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 36:28.
Id. at 37:43.
Id. at 40:38.
Id. at 44:00.
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referendum, then the ordinance is enacted again, then repealed—
76
it just goes back and forth!”
Justice Kennedy had addressed the same issue that Judy
Harrington, the anti-Amendment 2 campaign manager, and I had
discussed with respect to whether a repeal effort against
Amendment 2 would have been more effective than the
constitutional challenge. Would we have been playing legislative
and electoral ping-pong if we sought a repeal?
“There are other problems with dealing with civil rights
protections and generally, but let’s say they passed Amendment 2
but it didn’t target gay people. It simply said that no one can obtain
any protection from discrimination, arbitrary discrimination for
any reason. That would not present the problem that Amendment
2 presents. Amendment 2 is very selective. It targets only one group of
people, and that’s where it encounters equal protection
difficulties,” Jean explained. “The State may be able to rearrange its
process in any number of ways. It just can’t do it in a way that
77
prevents one particular group.”
Justice Scalia was not buying it. Returning to his earlier line of
questioning, the Justice wanted a full definition of “who” exactly
Amendment 2 did target. “How do you read the statute when it
refers to sexual orientation, homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices, or relationships?” Justice Scalia
asked. “Suppose a person who, let’s say, has a tendency to
homosexual conduct, but has never engaged in homosexual
conduct, is that person—would an ordinance that relates to that
person be covered by this?”
“Yes,” Jean replied firmly. “The Colorado Supreme Court did
interpret this initiative in this regard. It said that homosexual
conduct was subsumed within homosexual orientation, and—”
“Well, I’m sure it is, but what else? I mean, that’s the problem.
What else?”
“I don’t understand what you mean by ‘what else,’” Jean boldly
countered.
78
“Beyond homosexual conduct.”
Jean and Justice Scalia continued to dispute the meaning of
“homosexual conduct” and where it fit into Amendment 2. Jean

76.
77.
78.

Id. at 44:52.
Id. at 45:52.
Id. at 46:48.
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finally told the Court that homosexual “conduct” and “orientation”
79
were not mutually exclusive. Her point was to reinforce her earlier
statement: Amendment 2 was extremely broad in its attack on the
civil and political rights of its citizens.
Suddenly, the audience’s concentration was broken.
Conservative Justice Scalia directed a curt question about whether
Jean’s intention was to overturn Bowers. My colleagues and I had
80
feared such a reference.
In the very last row of the courtroom, supporters from
Colorado were conducting their own exchanges. Some of the men
had their heads bent praying; most of the women were transfixed
by the electrifying exchange unfolding before then. Others were
crying. The delegation grasped each other’s hands creating a silent
network. Please, let this be the decade that they say “yes” to civil
rights for gays and lesbians. It has to be now.
“Ms. Dubofsky, do you contend that—are you asking us to
overrule Bowers v. Hardwick?!” Justice Scalia stormed.
“No, I am not,” Jean replied.
“Well, there we said that you could make homosexual conduct
criminal. Why can a state not take a step short of that and say,
‘We’re not going to make it criminal, but on the other hand, we
certainly don’t want to encourage it, and therefore we will neither
have a state law giving it special protection,’” the Justice drilled,
“nor will we allow any municipalities to give it special protection. It
seems to me the legitimacy of the one follows from the legitimacy
of the other; if you can criminalize it, surely you can take that latter
step, can’t you?!”

79. See, e.g., Janet Lever & David E. Kanouse, Sexual Orientation and Proscribed
Sexual Behaviors, in OUT IN FORCE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE MILITARY 15, 33
(Gregory M. Herek et al. eds., 1996) (“Although current military policy equates
homosexual status (i.e., homosexual identity) with homosexual conduct (i.e.,
sexual behaviors), data indicate that they are not the same.”). Homosexual
“conduct” was a more difficult argument to defend against. The underlying
presumption is that conduct is not a mutable characteristic and therefore does not
deserve any heightened scrutiny under equal protection arguments. Id. at 22–23.
“Status,” on the other hand, denotes something more inherent and removes the
sexual conduct as the focus. Id.
80. Our intention was not to get lost in the weeds in an attempt to overturn
Bowers. We wanted to keep it narrowly focused on Colorado’s Amendment 2. In
retrospect, given how Lawrence v. Texas shook out six years later, this seems to have
been the right call. Arguably, in 1996, the country was not yet ready for that
change.
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I sank into the back of my chair. Emotionally, I was exhausted.
My eyes bounced back and forth from the verbal attack on Jean to
the LGBT community members in the audience and back to the
Supremes. I wished that the whole thing would vanish or that I
could just disappear.
In response to the last arrow shot, Jean responded, “What
you’ve done is deprived people, based on their homosexual
orientation, of a whole opportunity to seek protection from
discrimination, which is a very different thing.”
81
“So, do you do it when you throw them in jail for a felony?!”
Justice Scalia exclaimed.
What a degrading question, I thought, my mind briefly jogging
back to a media story about Rush Limbaugh’s third wedding being
82
officiated by Justice Clarence Thomas. What does sodomy have to
do with whether someone is allowed to eat in a restaurant, check
out a book, receive medical care, or secure employment? Back then
we did not even conceive that people would refuse to bake wedding
cakes or take photos for a gay wedding. In the 1990s, the
constitutional right to marry was in its fledgling stages.
At that same time, Hawaii, the first state to pass gay marriage
legislation—which would later be reversed—had LGBT tourists
83
travelling there to get married. The relationship between the
Amendment 2 case and the Hawaii same-sex marriage case, I knew,
was an important one. Pending in the Hawaii state courts was the
84
first major same-sex marriage case. The case began in 1991, a year
prior to the passage of Amendment 2. Three same-sex couples were
denied marriage licenses after exchanging vows. Challenging the
refusal in Hawaii’s lower courts, the couples, represented by
attorneys from Lambda Legal, were again denied. They appealed
the decision to Hawaii’s Supreme Court in May 1993. There the
couples found hope, as did gays and lesbians across the country.

81. Oral Argument at 53:12, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039).
82. Glenn Greenwald, Congrats to Rush Limbaugh on His Fourth Traditional
Marriage, SALON (June 6, 2010, 6:07 AM), http://www.salon.com/2010/06/06
/marriage_18/.
83. See Hawaiian Judge Upholds Same-Sex Marriages, CNN (Dec. 3, 1996, 5:50
PM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9612/03/same.sex.marriage/.
84. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); see also 1993: The Hawaii
Case of Baehr v. Lewin, FINDLAW, http://family.findlaw.com/marriage/1993-the
-hawaii-case-of-baehr-v-lewin.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2014) (summarizing the
holding of Baehr).
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The state high court ruled that the denial of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples appeared to violate Hawaii’s constitutional
85
guarantee of equal protection.
The couples argued that by allowing same-sex marriage, the
state would benefit, children of gays and lesbians would benefit,
and Hawaii would suffer no adverse effects. The lower court
decision was appealed again and the case went back to the Hawaii
Supreme Court in 1996, around the time that the Romer case went
to the United States Supreme Court. Same-sex marriage was in the
same hotbed of legal uncertainty as was Amendment 2. Once gays
and lesbians could legally marry in Hawaii, couples would
eventually travel to other states and challenge any anti-gay marriage
laws in effect. The Hawaiian government took three years, at the
taxpayers’ expense, to justify sex discrimination in marriage.
Attorneys for the government tried to show that same-sex marriages
would adversely affect children; children should grow up in
conventional families, and the State had an interest in promoting
86
traditional families. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was
passed in 1996, the same year as the Romer decision.
I focused my attention back on the oral argument. Jean was
still responding to Justice Scalia’s comparison of Amendment 2 and
Bowers.
“If homosexuals were put into the language of Amendment 2
only in terms of, those people who engage in homosexual conduct
shall not be entitled to ever seek protection under the civil rights
laws, we would say that is unconstitutional,” Jean exclaimed. “That’s
a very different thing from saying that you can criminalize
homosexual sodomy!” she added.
“Then how do you answer Justice Kennedy’s further question,
well, isn’t the State entitled to end a ping-pong game? The locality
passes it, the State repeals it. The locality passes it again, the State
repeals it again,” Justice Ginsburg interjected.
“The constitutional bar, in effect, to ever adopting a protection
of any sort, or an opportunity to seek protection from
discrimination, is a very different type of barrier than a simple
repealer and reenactment, because it means that if the group is

85.
86.

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
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going to ever obtain any protection, it has to amend the state
87
constitution first.” Jean said.
“Yes, but wouldn’t you say that it could end the ping-pong ball
that way if it ends it with respect to all protection against private
discrimination?” Justice Souter asked.
“That’s correct, it could,” Jean affirmed.
“That would not be an equal protection problem.”
“That’s right. That’s right,” Jean repeated.
“So you’re saying, if I understand you, you just can’t end the
ping-pong ball for this particular group?”
“That’s correct,” Jean replied, “or any particular group.”
“Right. Right.”
“It doesn’t matter who the group is—”
“Yes. Yes,” Justice Souter tried to finish.
“—you just couldn’t do it this way,” Jean said looking into the
Justices’ faces.
“But, you can end the game.”
88
“That’s correct,” Jean agreed.
“Thank you, Ms. Dubofsky,” Chief Justice Rehnquist said.
89
“Thank you,” Jean replied as she sat down.
Tymkovich rose to make his rebuttal. He had approximately
one minute in which to do so and began by quickly bringing
attention to the civil rights of the people of Colorado to pass and
enact an initiative. “Your Honor, the Colorado Supreme Court rule
basically holds that preemption is unconstitutional,” the attorney
opened. Before he was done with his reasoning on that particular
point he was again interrupted.
“Well, excuse me,” Justice Souter interjected, “I don’t see where
it said preemption was unconstitutional, as distinct from saying,
preemption for one identifiable group was unconstitutional.”
Tymkovich was stepping in the wrong territory now, I thought.
“It’s preemption of this issue that affects a group, and in James
90
the Court told us it’s permissible—” Tymkovich’s explanation was
91
cut off. There was the James case again. As a young attorney, I was
once told that if the facts in a case are against you, you argue the
87. Oral Argument at 55:00, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_1039.
88. Id. at 55:53.
89. Id. at 56:12.
90. Id. at 56:45.
91. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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law and vice versa. This was certainly true during the last hour. Jean
and the more liberal Justices discussed the factual implications of
Amendment 2, while Tymkovich and Justice Scalia wanted to talk
92
93
about the James and Bowers cases.
“Well, it doesn’t—it doesn’t—” Justice Souter interrupted, “the
ordinance speaks both in terms of issue, i.e., basis for claim, and
group. I mean, it refers to both, doesn’t it? You can’t have one
without the other, the way the ordinance is—”
“It’s an issue that affects a group, like in James and like in
94
Gregory v. Ashcroft,” Tymkovich continued to explain, “where we
had an age restriction in the state.”
“Well, isn’t it in effect defined in terms of the group under
traditional equal protection analysis, which looks to the intent of the
enacting body?”
“Right,” Tymkovich said, “and then there would be the
question—”
“Okay,” Justice Souter interrupted, holding up his hand.
“—of whether a rational basis supports that,” Tymkovich said,
struggling to fit in a more detailed explanation.
“Thank you, Mr.—” Chief Justice Rehnquist began.
“In this case—” Tymkovich said over the Justice.
“Thank you, Mr. Tymkovich,” Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
95
firmly. “The case is submitted.”
It was exactly 11:01 a.m.
More than four years of waiting ended in one hour of United
States Supreme Court points and counterpoints. As in most cases,
the Justices utilized the attorneys as conduits to convey their own
positions to each other. I took one last look at the imported marble
encrusted with symbolic sculpture decorating the courtroom. Now
the entire country would have to wait to see who among the nine
Justices had been persuaded.
Once the Court was adjourned, spectators and journalists
rushed to spread word of the oral arguments to the rest of the
world. As the Colorado delegation exited the courthouse and
descended the long white stairs, we were bombarded by
international, national, and local press. Having set up their
92. Id.
93. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
94. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
95. Oral Argument at 57:21, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039).
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technical equipment promptly after ticketed guests entered the
courthouse, the journalists anxiously awaited word of the hearing.
Recording devices of every size and shape littered the center of the
courtyard. Microphones with various station logos extended into
our faces as numerous TV cameras strained to catch a glimpse of
attorneys and plaintiffs together.
Stepping ahead to issue the first comments to reporters,
Suzanne Goldberg from Lambda Legal and Matt Coles, an attorney
from the ACLU, both attempted to legally interpret and impart
what had occurred inside. After waiting patiently, Jean and I
addressed the journalists who were still hungry for a sensational
comment for their news stories.
Descriptive renditions of the precedent-setting legal arguments
were only beginning to reverberate across the nation. We knew that
this first meeting with reporters was critical as to how America
would understand what had occurred inside. It was one thing to tell
the media our viewpoints regarding how the oral arguments
unfolded; it was quite another to voice the collective opinion of the
Justices and “foretell” their pending decision.
Our activities had climaxed into a political zenith that neither
Jean nor I had previously experienced. It was a moment of shared
bitter sweetness enriching our already extensive legal histories. One
half hour to dramatically influence those who judge the nation’s
injustice. Relieved that the oral arguments had progressed as they
had, all of us knew the contentment was temporary. Our fight to
overturn Amendment 2 now rested in the hands of nine very
human Americans.
“I am famished!” Jean said, turning to Katherine, her assistant.
She had just finished taking questions from reporters, and the
dense crowd outside was slowly breaking up.
“Me too, Jean.”
“Yeah, let’s go get some lunch,” I said.
“Let’s all go have lunch together at the Monocle,” Jean
offered.
Heading down the street on foot, I strained to see between
government buildings to the neighborhoods beyond. Inside the
courtroom, I had never lost sight of what the case was truly about:
ordinary people living ordinary lives.
Our nation’s capital—where deals are cut and scandals are our
way of life. A place where America’s brightest and most powerful
politicians gather to argue for change for all citizens. Where
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lobbyists and activists bang heads and shout their causes, shoulder
to shoulder with radicals, liberals, and conservatives. In many ways,
I had changed over those four years being involved in the antiAmendment 2 fight. I recalled the early days of my activism. Flush
in the center of a radical 1960s activist organization, marching
against the Vietnam War on behalf of my brother who was on the
front lines, my commitment then closely mirrored my dedication of
today. Richer, fuller idealism now came to me in ways I could never
have foreseen. I had matured and my skills were more diplomatic
and refined. By whatever means. Malcolm X’s words recalled images
of the Black Panthers, many of whom were still imprisoned for
their political beliefs. Others melted into the mainstream, their
hair now gray and their children grown. The once angry activists
were now applying their political talents to meetings with corporate
managers in high-rise offices.
After our small group of attorneys, activists, and plaintiffs had
arrived and been seated for lunch, we shared our viewpoints and
feelings. We laughed and cried together; the ad hoc luncheon gave
everyone a chance to unwind and release the emotions of the tense
hour they had silently spent in the courtroom. Light-hearted jokes
blended with serious discussion about the implications of the
morning’s presentation. Everyone seemed to avoid talking about
what the final decision would be and when it would be given.
“That’s Justice Powell,” Jean called out to us.
“Who?” Frank Brown, CLIP director, asked.
“What’s everybody talking about?”
“Who?” someone repeated.
“Former Supreme Court Justice Powell,” Jean explained,
pointing casually across the room. Sitting with what appeared to be
two colleagues was an elderly man dressed in a dark suit and tie.
“He’s one of the Supreme Court Justices who sat on the bench
96
when the 1986 Bowers v. Hardwick case was decided.”
“You mean Georgia’s sodomy case?!” another asked.
“That’s the one,” I said, shaking my head. “He voted for it.”
“I heard somewhere that he made an about-face on that vote,”
Jean interjected. “Powell said that if he had to do it all over again,
he would have voted against Bowers. You know it’s never too late
for someone to change . . .”

96.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Justice Powell was appointed by President Eisenhower in 1956,
and was considered a liberal when he sat on the High Court bench.
In October of 1990, three years after his retirement, Powell told a
group of New York University law students, “I think I probably
97
made a mistake in that one.” Besides Bowers, the only other
change he would have liked to have made was to add the Equal
98
Rights Amendment to the Constitution.
The politics surrounding the Bowers case were filled with irony.
The case was brought by the Georgia Attorney General’s Office.
The attorney representing Georgia was Michael Bowers. In 1997,
the skeletons in Michael Bowers’ closet would begin to surface.
That year, as a leading gubernatorial candidate for Georgia, Bowers
99
admitted to an adulterous ten-year affair. Resigning his position as
the state’s attorney general on June 1, 1997, Bowers, a married
father of three children, broke his own promise to uphold the
100
law. Never clearly disclosing when the affair ended, his newsmaking tryst again brought attention to Georgia law. Adultery, like
sodomy, was illegal in the southern state. Bowers would ultimately
101
be overturned by Lawrence v. Texas in 2003, which cited the Romer
102
case.
For now, the other attorneys, activists, supporters, and I were
content with the day we had just endured. Life suddenly looked a
little different, a little more hopeful. The continued fight for civil
rights for gays and lesbians could now wait—at least until the
following day.
Before departing Washington, D.C., I visited the Gay and
Lesbian Victory Fund. Upon entering their offices, Kathleen
Debold, the political director of the organization, pulled me
quickly into her office.

97. Gay & Lesbian Archives of the Pac. Nw., Bowers v. Hardwick, SODOMY L.,
http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/bowers/bowers.htm (last updated Apr. 18,
2007).
98. See Edward Lazarus, The Ghost of Justice Powell: How His Cautious
Conservatism Still Haunts the Supreme Court, FINDLAW (July 10, 2003),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20030710.html.
99. Kevin Sack, Georgia Candidate for Governor Admits Adultery and Resigns
Commission in Guard, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at A, available at 1997 WLNR
4879916.
100. Id.
101. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
102. Id. at 560.
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“Mary,” Kathleen whispered. “You understand we are going to
lose this thing. The Justices are not going to decide in our favor.”
“Who told you that?!” I asked.
“That’s the word here in Washington, D.C., Mary,” Kathleen
responded. The LGBT law professors and national organizations
apparently all thought that we had a loser case.
“Well, the word is wrong,” I said matter-of-factly. “We are going
to win and we’re going to do so on the rational basis argument. I
am confident that the Justices will decide in our favor. In fact, I’m
sure the vote will be 6–3 in our favor! We have a just cause here,
Kathleen!”
The Supreme Court opinion on the Romer case was indeed 6–3
on a rational basis theory. Amen. I participated in a rally with over
4000 in attendance on the steps of the Colorado State Capitol
Building on the day of the Supreme Court decision. I said, “How
does it feel to know that the Constitution is alive and well and living
in Colorado?” While I was speaking to the audience, a filmmaker
captured me and this comment was used in the documentary film,
103
After Stonewall. I then said, “It ain’t over till the fat lady sings,” and
proceeded to sing “God Bless America.” The crowd roared with
laughter.
The language and dicta authored by Justice Kennedy would be
argued and quoted in many LGBT cases over the next fifteen years.
He wrote: “[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
104
toward the class of persons affected.” This language was cited in
the oral arguments and briefs for the 2013 United States Supreme
105
106
Court cases on DOMA and California Proposition 8, as well as
in the new round of marriage cases before the federal appeals
courts.
Once the marriage issue is totally resolved, I believe that the
Romer language will be used in cases concerning religious freedom.
Business owners may have a harder time espousing a religious

103. AFTER STONEWALL (First Run Features 1999). This film was the second in
a two-part series that depicted and documented the Gay Rights Movement in the
U.S., from its inception, to the Romer case and beyond, to the beginnings of the
gay marriage movement. Id. Part I included the Mattachine Society and the
Daughters of Bilitis, and Part II included the Stonewall Riots and Romer. Id.
104. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
105. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
106. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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belief argument to deny LGBTs a public accommodation when it
stands in stark contrast to people who take those positions solely
because of their “animosity toward a class of persons.”
The Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution to forbid
laws that reflect “animus” against gay and lesbian Americans, and
last year’s decision in United States v. Windsor reaffirmed this anti107
animus principle. Given the motives of those who support the
expansion of religious exemptions, it is not difficult to construct an
argument that the new laws would deny equal protection under the
law. The Romer case, in my opinion, will go down in the annals of
108
LGBT history as the LGBT Brown v. Board of Education. I am
grateful to have been involved in the case.

107.
108.

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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